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Democratization of the Administration –  






                                          
 
Civil Society and Administration 
 
n this article I will examine from the analysis of the reforms of Japanese administration 
whether the possibility exists that civil society can contribute to the democratization of 
state organizations. I will also refer to the theoretical debate in Germany in order to gain 
useful suggestions for this study. 
Civil society consists of many kinds of groups which aim to spread their own views 
and interests. It is true that interest groups have long existed in every democratic country. 
They have acted, and still now act, politically, but their relationship with politics has been 
faced with the same skepticism as corporatism or cliental politics. This negative image 
comes from the modality and use of their influence. Their political power relies on their 
economical power, and so they are not transparent or open to the public. Their dialogues with 
state organizations are mostly not open to public scrutiny. This mechanism seems to give 
some groups a privileged status. 
I realize that the attention to civil society has grown because the activities of various 
groups in society have shown significant influences on national and international politics in 
recent years. Citizens exercise their freedom of speech and association to appeal to the public 
for some issues which they believe are necessary to improve or “save” the society. These 
voluntary activities have been playing an important social and political role. The basis of 
their influence lies in support from citizens. The main field of their activities is the civil 
society itself, not in the direct connection with state organizations, even if they want to 
influence the political process. 
In the parliamentary system, parliament is the central organ to sum up the various 
interests and views of the people. Parliament and the ruling parties have been criticized, 
however, for being not sensitive enough to the real wishes of citizens. Jürgen Habermas, a 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Kyoto University. This article is a revised version of my lecture at the workshop “Roles of 
Citizen/Civil Society and Responsibility of State” in the IVR World Congress in Frankfurt am Main in 2011. I thank 
Tatsuji Ohno for his invitation to the workshop and his comment there. 




© CPG 2011 
central figure in stressing the political role of civil society, has observed, “Even the political 
parties, which, according to the German Basic Law, Article 21, are entitled to ‘participate in 
forming the political will of the people’ have now become an independent power cartel 
integrating all branches of government.”1 It is expected that the influences from civil society 
can break this cartel and make the lawmaking process more transparent and sensitive to the 
discussions outside of parliament. “Here the social substratum for the realization of the 
system of rights consists … in the currents of communication and public opinion that, 
emerging from civil society and the public sphere, are converted into communicative power 
through democratic procedures.”2   
As Habermas recognizes, however, the power of parliament as legislator has 
weakened in the face of today’s complex social conditions. In order to correspond to the 
rapid changes of knowledge and technology, the contents of laws cannot be stable or 
concrete. “The weak binding power of regulatory law, however, demands compensations 
primarily in the area of administration, where officials can no longer restrict their activity to 
a normatively neutral, technically competent implementation of statutes.” When the 
administration must decide politically, it should do so “in forms of communication and 
according to procedures that satisfy the conditions of constitutional legitimacy. This implies 
a ‘democratization’ of the administration.”3 One can call this manner of “democratization” as 
a bottom up process because communication starts at the grass root level and grows its 
influence toward the top of the administration.  
This demand of democratization of the administration has difficulties, however, 
because it does not have such a fixed form as parliament has in the Constitution. There is no 
universally right answer to the problem which forms of participation are most legitimate and 
suited to reflect the opinions of citizens. Habermas describes it as “a question of the interplay 
of institutional imagination and cautious experimentation,” but he thinks of course that this is 
an experiment worth trying.
4
 
When one refers to the democratization of the administration, however, one does 
not necessarily mean strengthening the influence of civil society. I will explain the 
ambivalence in this concept by showing the experience of the reform of administrative 
organizations in Japan.  
 
The Reform of the Administrative Organization in Japan 
 
 In the 1990s the most important reform of administrative organizations since the 
1940s was carried out in Japan. The central aim of this reform was to break the “rule of 
bureaucracy,” which was considered as the characteristic of Japanese society as a whole. The 
lack of transparency of the policy-making process in Japan was criticized both within and 
without. The Basic Act on Central Government Reform, the law summarizing the reform 
policies, included provisions which prescribed the administration to open its structure to 
greater public participation and scrutiny. The effort to foster greater transparency of 
                                                 
1 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996), transl. by William Rehg, p. 434. 
2 Ibid., p. 442.  
3 Ibid., p. 440. See also James Bohman, Public Deliberation (1996), pp. 188-192. 
4 Ibid., p. 441. 
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government processes and actions was partially realized with the passage of the Freedom of 
Information Act in Japan. In addition it sought to ensure that “the government will reflect the 
public opinion in the policy making and keep this process fair and transparent.” When the 
government wants to formulate an important policy, it should make its proposal public in 
order to “invite opinions of specialists, persons concerned and the people in general” and 
take these into consideration (so called “public comments”).5 “Public comments” were 
introduced by a revision of the Administrative Procedures Act. 
 These measures presupposed a positive role of the smooth flow of information 
across the boundary of administrative organizations. The laws seeking to foster greater 
fairness and transparency reflected long standing criticisms of the Japanese bureaucracy that 
it acted in the opaque manner in its dealings with interest groups. These reforms envisioned 
the participation of various citizens many of whom did not have privileged status. We might 
say that the reformers were aware of the significance of civil society as the force for 
democratizing the administration. 
However, this manner of democratization was never envisioned as the focus of the 
reform agenda. Its main aim was the “reinforcement of the function of cabinet.”6 The Basic 
Act on Central Government Reform set forth clearly that the prime minister has the explicit 
power to propose important policies in the cabinet and founded new organizations to support 
the function of the cabinet, especially the office of the prime minister. The reform flowed 
from the belief that the administration should be democratized from the top down. The 
political legitimacy derives from the will of the people which is shown primarily in the result 
of elections, and so the ministers, especially the prime minister, should lead the 
administrative organizations powerfully.  
At the same time a certain constitutional theory which aimed to strengthen the 
democratic legitimacy of the cabinet came to exert great influence in Japan. It insisted that 
the election should function in fact as the direct decision of the ruling party and the cabinet. 
In Japan the LDP possessed the majority of parliament for a long time. Therefore the election 
did not function as the chance to select the ruling party. The cabinet changed only as a result 
of struggles in the party. This political situation seemed to be a possible reason why the 
government was chronically so weak. Because it could not rely on the mandate of the 
electorate, it could not accomplish its policies against the sustained resistance of the 
bureaucracy. It was said that to break this boundary, the cabinet should derive their political 
legitimacy from the direct consent of the people. This theory did not demand the introduction 
of the presidential system (this would require a constitutional amendment), but the changes 
to the election and party system sought to frame the election as an opportunity to endow the 
cabinet with a true public mandate. It aimed also to democratize the administration by 
strengthening the actual power of ministers.
7
 
We can see from what has been said that the reform in Japan included two different 
ways to democratize the administration, though this fact was rarely mentioned. Though these 
alternatives could cooperate to break the power of the bureaucracy, there was, theoretically 
                                                 
5 Basic Act on Central Government Reform, Art. 50. 
6 Basic Act on Central Government Reform, Art. 1. 
7 See Kazuyuki Takahashi, Kokuminn-naikaku-sei no Rinen to Un’you (Idea and Practice of the Cabinet Selected by 
the People) (1994). 
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viewed, a deep tension between them. In order to democratize the administration from the 
top down, one may suppose, the organization should be structured hierarchically. Its aim 
could be realized only by the recognition by the permanent bureaucracy of the principle of 
ministerial leadership and responsibility. To the contrary, opening the administration to the 
inputs from civil society implies weakening the function of hierarchy. It would mean the 
recognition of the democratic legitimacy of the policy-making process at the bottom of the 
organization which cooperates with outside transparently. However, regrettably no debate is 
underway in Japan on the relationship of the different potentialities implicit in the 
comprehensive reform of the administration. 
In Germany, in contrast, the normative meaning of the various administrative 
organizations has been discussed as an important problem of Constitutional Law. We will 
now turn to the consideration of this dispute to know the problem more exactly.  
 
Controversy About the Content of Democratic Legitimacy in Germany 
 
 Christoph Möllers insisted in 1999 that the meaning of democracy for the 
organization of the administration was one of the most disputed themes in German public 
law. The main issue is “if there can be another model of legitimacy of administration than the 
classical form of the administrative organization which is directed at the ideal type of 
hierarchical ministerial administration.” It is said that the projects to give some 
administrative organizations the autonomous legitimacy are enabled by opening them to 
subjects who can claim their status to democratize them. The opposite side asserts that such a 
chance of participation of persons concerned cannot claim democratic legitimacy at all.
8
  
This controversy was sharpened in Germany during the 1990s when the German 
Federal Constitutional Court showed a very hard attitude against the doctrine of 
“autonomous legitimacy” of the administration. It declared a law of a Land unconstitutional 
which allowed a representative organ of public servants to participate in the decision-making 
process of the administration about all matters concerning themselves. The Court thought 
that the principle of popular sovereignty implied that the people should influence the 
activities of the state effectively. To guarantee this constitutional request, it demanded so 
called “uninterrupted chain of legitimation” from the people via a parliament selected by 
them and the government relying on its confidence to the public servants bound by the orders 
of the government. In contrast, the participation of public servants could not have a meaning 
of democratizing the administration. It was the people as a whole that should influence the 
acts of the state. No parts of them could have privileged status. To give the representative 
organ of public servants the authority to decide with the administrative organizations meant 
to privilege a special interest group, however. “There is no room for ‘autonomy’ of public 
employees even in the matters of public employment.” The principle of democracy required 
that only the positions which could take responsibility to parliament through the control of 
the government might make the last decisions.
9
  
                                                 
8 See Christoph Möllers, “Braucht das öffentliche Recht einen neuen Methoden- und Richtungsstreit?” in 
Verwaltungsarchiv 90 (1999), pp. 187, 188f. 
9 BVerfGE 93, 37, 66-70. 
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The Constitutional Court showed its concept of democracy more clearly in a 
decision against the suffrage of foreigners. It declared there that the holder of the sovereign 
power was the people and that this people meant the German nationals, which built a united 
group as the subject of democracy. The principle of popular sovereignty did not imply that 
the decisions of the state should be legitimated by the persons concerned at each time. 
Democracy presupposed by the German Basic Law had nothing to do with the idea that the 
holders of political rights should be congruent with the persons subject to the state power.
10
  
This hard attitude of the Constitutional Court was supported by the constitutional 
theory of a judge of that day, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. According to this theory, 
democracy, first of all, is a political concept and the people as the sovereign are forming “a 
political unity of destiny” which has to decide as a unity. In this sense, it cannot be dissolved 
into an amalgam of private persons who aim to participate according to their own interests 
only. Therefore, he distinguishes strictly between democracy as a political principle and the 
demands of various particularistic groups (pressure groups) to influence on policies as an 
expression of private interests.
11
 In fact, he assigns the parliament to legitimately monopolize 
the representation of the sovereign because only it is selected by the whole people in the 
framework of parliamentary system. According to his theory, the participation of 
particularistic groups in the democratic decision-making process violates democratic 
principles. It may rather disrupt the function of democracy also by obstructing the orders of 
the government responsible to parliament. Therefore, the administrative body has to be 
structured hierarchically to secure the legitimate flow of political authority.   
One can realize easily that Böckenforde’s theory is much influenced by the 
decisionism of his teacher (Lehrer) Carl Schmitt. Such a theory seems to take a too state-
centered view of democracy and tends to forget the real situation of the people. The daily 
politics need not demand the decision of the people destined to unify themselves, but should 
grasp their various wishes. “The people as a whole” should not be treated as a mythical 
entity. 
Many scholars have criticized the understanding of democracy by Böckenförde and 
the Constitutional Court as far as the Court followed his positions during his tenure. The 
Basic Law itself seems to allow various structures of federal administration in Art. 86 and 
87. In today’s complex society, furthermore, the “effective” influence of the people on 
policies which the Court demanded in some decisions during Böckenförde´s tenure cannot be 
realized by the only one way through parliament. The fetishism of “uninterrupted chain of 
legitimation” cannot give the people any real power. Just to substitute for this weakness, it is 
necessary to consider various structures of administrative organizations which can keep up 
with the real wishes of the people. In contrast to the abstract legitimacy of politicians 
selected by elections, the groups of citizens do not lose their concrete existence in the society 
even in the process of participation. Public interest can be found not by ignoring various 
interests of private citizens, but only by considering them with a broad outlook.
12
 
                                                 
10 BVerfGE 83, 37, 50-52. 
11 See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip” in idem, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie 
(1991), pp. 289, 311-316. 
12 See, e.g., Brun-Otto Bryde, “Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg der Demokratietheorie, 
Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis” in Staatswisschaften und Staatspraxis  (1994), 5,  p. 305; Alfred Rinken, 
“Demokratie und Hierarchie“ in Kritische Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1996), 
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Horst Dreier shows a balanced position about this problem. He admits the necessity 
of the hierarchy principle in administrative organization in order to secure democratic 
legitimacy, but is cautious not to treat it as an absolute claim. The function of hierarchy is 
dependent on many conditions which are now difficult to meet, for example, clear provisions 
of laws and a stable environment. Without these the administration itself becomes a “power 
factor.” In order to control it and make it work appropriately for concrete situations, the 
participation of citizens is needed.
13
 On the other hand, he is aware that the independence of 
administrative sectors includes the danger that they might liberate themselves from the 
political programs of the state as a whole and pursue their segmental interests with the 
opaque cooperation with particular groups. The law must prevent this danger by keeping the 
control of these organs. It should prescribe the basic frame of policies to be made, fair rules 
of participation, transparency of the process and so on. Then these organs could claim their 
democratic character to some extent, even if not the people as a whole, but only persons 
concerned participate. Autonomy is not irrelevant to democracy. “Only the balance between 




In fact, the German Federal Constitutional Court itself has relaxed its hard attitude 
against the autonomy of the administrative organization after the retirement of Böckenförde. 
In a decision for an autonomous administrative sector, it admitted that the democracy which 
demanded real influence of the people allowed organization types different from the 
hierarchy. Both democracy and functional autonomy were based on the idea that people 
should decide themselves freely. “The Basic Law allowed also special forms of participation 
of persons concerned in the exercise of public functions.” Of course, their structure should 
secure fair consideration of the interests concerned.
15
 
We can conclude that to organize the administrative body strictly according to the 
principle of hierarchy in order to strengthen the political leadership ignores the real roots of 
deficits of democracy. We should point out, however, that even the theory in Germany 
asserting that the hierarchical principle has only a relative validity admits the necessity of 
control of the law which should include the rules making the participation in the 
administration fair and transparent. Only then the participation of citizens can be worth 
trying to democratize the state administration. When these conditions are met, on the other 
hand, we should not be too cautious about the role of civil society even if it consists of 
groups claiming particularistic aims. Policies should be made during an administrative 
process which attempts to gather various claims and to transform them to policies in the 
public interest. We should stress the importance of this process all the more, because its 
participants cannot be appointed through such an official process as the election, even if the 
administration tries to select them as fairly as possible. Their considerations, therefore, 
should be exposed widely to criticism from the outside.  
                                                                                                                              
70, p. 282; Thomas Blanke, “Antidemokratische Effekte der verfassungsgerichtlichen Demokratietheorie” in 
Kritische Justiz  (1998), 31, p. 452. See as a book supporting the doctrine of Böckenförde, Matthias Jestaedt, 
Demokratieprinzip und Kondominialverwaltung (1993).  
13 See Horst Dreier, Hierarchische Verwaltung im demokratischen Staat (1991), p. 145-157. 
14Ibid., pp. 283-293. See also Thomas Groß, Das Kollegialprinzip in der Verwaltungsorganization (1999), pp. 165-
199, 251-270. 
15 BVerfGE 107,59, 91-94. 
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I want to add that democratizing the administration from the bottom up does not 
necessarily mean a pursuit of consensus of all relevant groups in the society. Consensus is 
desirable, of course, but the aim of an administrative procedure which is open to concerned 
persons does not imply the necessity of consent as such. It only aims at making policies 
suited to the concrete situation. To give each group a veto power might diminish its readiness 
to compromise and disrupt the function of the respective procedures. Discussion must be 
ended at some time and the matter must be decided even against the objection of a minority. 
The term of deliberation must be neither too short nor too long. It is also the responsibility of 





“Public Comments” and Councils in Japan 
 
 We have now gained the theoretical viewpoints to consider the possibility and 
conditions of democratization of the administration from the bottom up. We will now 
analyze the concrete measures taken by the reform of administrative organizations in Japan. 
As we have seen, its main concept was to strengthen the leadership of the cabinet. Therefore, 
the risk to lose the unity of policies which is truly included in the democratization from the 
bottom did not need to be worried sincerely. On the other hand, it did not try to close the 
organization to accomplish the orders of the ministers, but tried to open it to be able to reflect 
people’s real wishes. Although the reform admitted the ultimate superiority of officially 
elected politicians, it did not take a fictitious view about their democratic legitimacy. We can 
say that the project itself took a balanced way to reform the Japanese bureaucracy, although 
it was not fully aware of it. Of course, there remain concrete problems to be mentioned. 
As we have already seen, the reform introduced the institution of “public 
comments.” The revised Administrative Procedures Act requires that after comments are 
gathered the administration make public the summary of the comments and its reactions to 
them. If it does not adopt some opinions, it must show the reason. The law does not allow it 
to ignore them. “Public comments” have been established as a normal step to make policies.  
There are critical comments to the democratizing role of “public comments,” 
however. Comments are invited only after the courses of the policies are decided in the 
administration. The competence to judge how persuasive each comment is also remains by it. 
“Public Comments” do not involve the process to construct policies with citizens’ ideas. We 




I can agree with this criticism, but I still want to stress the important meaning of 
“public comments.” It gives all citizens official chances to say something concretely about 
policies of the state, although as a result their power remains very weak. Not only the 
privileged interest groups, but all the persons concerned gain the possibility to influence 
them. It has stimulated activities of many groups in fact. Furthermore, the response of the 
                                                 
16 See Armin von Bogdandy, “Demokratisch, demokratischer, am demokratischsten?” in Festschrift für Alexander 
Hollerbach (2001), pp. 363, 373-376.  
17 See Akiko Toyoshima, “Public Comments” no Igi to Kadai (Significance and Problems of “Public Comments”) in 
Jumin-sanka no System-kaikaku (Tsutomu Muroi ed. 2003), pp. 174, 189f.  
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administration to the comments which is opened to the public might arouse continuing 
debate. Anyway, “public comments” do not involve any severe problem of legitimacy. They 
are not exclusive, and the power to control the process remains undoubtedly by the 
administration.    
To the contrary, councils which consist of limited members appointed by the 
administration and deliberate on specific policies to make a proposal were treated coldly in 
the reform. The Basic Act on Central Government Reform prescribed to abolish them in 
principle
18
. This rather radical judgment against the councils could be explained by the idea 
that in fact they are covers of the bureaucracy. Only the specialists who are friendly to the 
bureaucracy are gathered and they rather disrupt the leadership of politicians by relying on 
their professional authority. Councils became then a symbol of the opaque relationship 
between the bureaucracy and interest groups.  
Is it really possible, however, for the administration to build policies without 
councils? Tokiyasu Fujita, a famous professor of Administrative Law and one of the central 
figures of the reform project, thinks it is possible. He supposes that the establishment of both 
“public comments” and “the meetings of specialists in the true meaning” is able to substitute 
for councils and function better than these.
19
 It means that the organs for democratic 
legitimacy and for technical reasoning can and should be separated. The meetings of limited 
specialists should be purified to technical problems without political relevance.  
This severance seems both impossible and undesirable, however. The power of 
“public comments” is weak, as we have seen. Moreover, it is illusionary to suppose the place 
purified from politics. In the technical problems so highly developed that the help of 
specialists is needed, we cannot expect their agreements. Especially, the problem what 
society should do with uncertain data and analyses divides them necessarily according to 
their political attitudes. They cannot help considering the related interests in the society. And 
so, the inevitable political meaning of their activities arouses critics in the public inevitably. 
The knowledge of specialists has only a relative superiority to that of citizens at least in the 
politics and should not be treated as an authority free form criticism of citizens. We need not 




Fujita’s theory may come from his concern that the discussion of limited members 
cannot claim democratic legitimacy. But this seems a too narrow conception of it. When the 
rules of participation and discussion are improved to fulfill the standards of fairness and 
transparency, the role of councils to democratize the administration should not be denied. 
Contrary to “public comments,” they are able to build policies autonomously. I suppose that 
well equipped councils can gather both technical information and its political implication 
from various sides of specialists and citizens concerned with social problems. It is 
meaningful from the viewpoint of democracy to build up public policies through their 
discussion. To improve the democratic character of councils, we must take care of the 
                                                 
18 See Basic Act on Central Government Reform, Art.30 (2) 
19 See Tokiyasu Fujita, “Singikai-seido Zakkan (Some Consideration on Councils)” in Gyoseiho no Kiso-riron II 
242 (2005). See as criticism Hiroshi Shiono, Gyoseiho III (Administrative Law III) (3rd ed. 2006), pp. 80-82  
20 See Carl Schmitt, ”Das Problem der innerpolitischen Neutralität des Staates” (1930) in idem, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze (1958), pp. 41, 49-51.  
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connection of discussions between inside and outside. They should be exposed to critics in 
order not to be transformed to a place giving privileges to specific interests. Transparency is 
indeed demanded for the councils saved from abolishment also in the Basic Act.
21
 In recent 
years many interim reports of councils are publicized and “public comments” on them are 
invited which are able to exert an influence on the final version. The combination of 
procedures like this surely contributes to improving the legitimacy of proposed policies.      
Several measures have been taken in Japan to advance the fairness of the 
appointment of members of councils, for example, to require the agreement of parliament 
and to advertise for the position publicly. The former enables to examine the aptitude of 
candidates publicly, but involves the danger to strengthen the political antagonism in 
councils. I suppose that this risk is not so high in Japan, however, because the social groups 
there are not structured according to the inclination of political parties. 
In these years, the practice of inviting applications for the council members from 
citizens has been spreading rapidly in the local governments. It is not clear, however, if this 
method is suited to the role of councils to gather relevant knowledge and to adjust the 
interests concerned.
22
 It is true that each council is established for a specific aim and is not 
the general representative organ of the people. With this method of selection, however, it 
becomes possible to recruit persons concerned with whom the administration has no contact. 
It is impossible for the officials of the administration to make clear who has a relevant 
interest with the topic to be discussed, even if they want to gather relevant ideas widely. To 
improve the democratic character of councils, after all, the relevance should not be decided 
one-sidedly by the administration. We can consider the public invitation of council members 
to be a method to open them to the persons concerned who act independently of the state so 
far. I think that this method is not contrary to the character of councils. In fact, most 
applicants are the persons who are much interested in the theme. If more persons apply for 
the position than needed, therefore, the members should not be decided by lot, but the 
persons who have more relevant interest and more knowledge should be selected. We should 
not forget that even so the interests represented in a council cannot be perfectly 




The public invitation of council members enlarges the chance of the groups in civil 
society to participate in the policy-making process. This has a positive meaning for its 
democratic character, because they have the background of the citizens supporting their 
views freely. Differing from the interest groups which gain their political power from their 
economical influence, furthermore, the groups acting in civil society have to take care of the 
transparent relationship between inside and outside the councils. We must notice, however, 
that their opinions remain those of partial groups in the society. There is no group which is 
representative of the people as a whole, and the amalgam of the groups in councils is not yet 
                                                 
21 See Basic Act on Central Government Reform, Art.30 (5). In fact, as Fujita recognizes, the number of councils did 
not diminish drastically through the reform.   
22 See Akiko Toyoshima, “Shingikai ni okeru Jumin-sanka no Mondai (The Problems about the Participation of 
Citizens in Councils)” in Jumin-sanka no System-kaikaku (Tsutomu Muroi ed. 2003), pp. 174, 189f. 
23 See Hans-Heinrich Trute, “Die demokratische Legitimation der Verwaltung” in Grundlagen des 
Verwaltungsrechts, Bd. I (2006), p. 307, marginal note100 (saying that the cooperation with private persons rather 
increases the burden of the administration.) 
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equal to the people. The administration has to take care to keep various opinions heard in the 
discussion and, as I have already said, to end it when it is ripe enough to decide. Opinions of 
each group themselves are not worth realizing. The councils must take responsibility for 
building up public policies from various real wishes of the people. There may remain losers. 
Of course, the attachment of a minority opinion may be meaningful to give useful 
information for the discussion which can and should continue after the end of the 
deliberation in the councils.  
We can now conclude that opening the administration to civil society is not an easy 
task. It includes both the possibility to democratize it and the danger to invite its dysfunction. 
The real concerns of the people should be heard, but at the same time they must be 
transformed to public policies through deliberation. The moderate control of officials is 
needed in this process, but it must not be excessive, otherwise the autonomous dynamics of 
the process would be suffered. Anyway, “this ambivalence is to be endured”24 to make the 
state organizations more democratic.  
 
                                                 
24 Dreier, Hierarchische Verwaltung, p. 275. 
